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Abstract
Public education is one of the largest components of the public sector in Colombia, in term of its size,
share of public expenditures, and geographic coverage. In 1997, Colombia had 85 thousand educational
establishments, 390 thousand teachers, and 8.6 million students. In addition, public school teachers
and educational staff comprise the highest percentage of public sector employment. During the last
half of the 1980s, the Central government promoted a reorganization of the state administration to
give municipalities a greater responsibility in financing and administering most public services. This
paper examines various aspects of the public education system in Colombia and evaluates the impact
of the educational reforms adopted in the last decade. Our empirical analysis suggests that with the
exception of teacher salaries, which experienced a significant increase after 1994, the trends in several
measures of educational outcomes are roughly similar both before and after 1994. It seems unlikely,
therefore, that the education reforms had much impact on Colombia’s education system. The paper
concludes by making a number of policy recommendations that could improve the allocation of
resources in this large and important sector.
* We thank Lorena Hernández and Alejandra Corchuelo at Fedesarrollo for excellent research assistance; Francisco Javier
Lasso at the National Planning Department for the construction of data series, and all the participants at the Cartagena meeting.3
I. Introduction
Public education is one of the largest components of the public sector in Colombia, in term of its size,
share of public expenditures, and geographic coverage. In 1997, Colombia had 85 thousand educational
establishments, 390 thousand teachers, and 8.6 million students. One out of every five Colombians
is currently enrolled in the public education system, and 36 percent of central government tax
revenues are allocated to public education. In addition, public school teachers and educational staff
comprise the highest percentage of public sector employment.
During the last half of the 1980s, the Central government promoted a reorganization of the state
administration to give municipalities a greater responsibility in financing and administering most public
services. Therefore, the reorganization of the education system was developed in the context of a general
decentralization of public administration. However, there has been some confusion as to which level of
government is best suited to administer the public education system. Law 29 of 1989 favored the muni-
cipalization of public education, but the 1991 Constitution emphasized the role of the departmental level.
Similarly, Law 60 of 1993, which regulates the system of transfers of central funds to departments and
municipalities, enhances the role of municipalities in the administration of public funds for education.
In contrast, Law 115 of 1994, the General Education Law, responded to pressure from the teachers’ union
and assigned a greater role to the departments. This confusion is reflected in the fact that there are three
different types of public school teachers in Colombia: the central government funds national teachers,
departmental governments fund departmental teachers, and municipalities fund municipal teachers.
It is widely recognized that there are serious inefficiencies in the allocation of resources in Colom-
bia’s public education system. These inefficiencies include the setting of teachers salaries by the
central government, the generosity of the pension systems available to teachers, and the allocation of
educational resources to different geographic areas. This paper examines various aspects of the pu-
blic education system in Colombia. We begin our analysis with a description of the main institutional
features of public education in Colombia. We then evaluate the impact of the education reforms that took
place in the early 1990s. Our empirical analysis suggests that with the exception of teacher salaries, which
experienced a significant increase after 1994, the trends in several measures of educational outcomes are
roughly similar both before and after 1994. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the education reforms had
much impact on Colombia’s education system. We conclude by making a number of policy re-
commendations that could improve the allocation of resources in this large and important sector.
II. Institutional Characteristics
Table 1 reports the trends in public employment in Colombia. In relative terms, public employment
peaked in 1980, when it made up 9.3 percent of the occupied population. By 1999, 7.8 percent of the
occupied population was employed in the public sector.
Table 2 shows that these civil servants are concentrated in three groups: teachers, judicial
employees, and the military. The teachers make up the largest group and accounted for 26 percent
of public employees in 1999.
A. Education Reforms
A key goal of the 1991 Constitution was to offer universal coverage in basic education (nine grades)
to Colombia’s population. To achieve this goal, the Constitution initiated the process of decentralizing
the administration of the public education system.4
It is worth pointing out that through these reforms, Colombia hoped to resolve one of the main
sources of administrative and labor conflicts in the education system: the vagueness with which
responsibilities are allocated to the various levels of government.1 As we will see, however, the
reforms did not completely solve these issues, nor did they address a key source of the chronic
financial predicament facing public education: the level of government responsible for providing
public education is not the level of government that pays for it.
B. Education Bureaucracy
Colombia has a central government, 1170 municipalities, 4 special districts and 32 departments. The
regent Nacional Constitution (1991) defines the country as unitary, but decentralized. During the
1990s, the jurisdiction in education was defined as follows:
The administration of the public education system in Colombia has three levels: the central level
includes the Ministry of Education and other relatively autonomous agencies addressing issues related
to higher education or to science and technology. The departmental level includes the Departmental
Secretaries of Education, the Regional Educational Fund created to administer the resources transferred
Table 1. Evolution of Public Employment
Years Thousands of % of occupied Annual rate of
workers population growth
1970    437.8 6.5 -
1975   608.4    8.2    6.8
1980   846.0   9.3  6.8
1985  913.4    8.8   1.5
1990  986.6    8.2   1.6
1995  994.0    7.2   0.1
1996   1001.3    6.8   0.7
1997  1025.5   6.8  2.4
1998   1103.5   7.2  7.6
1999  1193.6  7.8  8.2
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. DANE. Several years.
Table 2. Main Groups of Public Employees, 1999
Number of employees % of total
Teachers 310,000 26.0
Military and police employees 225,000 18.9
Judges and judicial employees 40,900 3.4
Total public employment 1.193.600          100.0
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. DANE.
1 Although from the Constitution of 1886, the Departments and other territorial entities had the responsibility of looking
after the primary education, the constitutional reform of 1968 established that the Law would determine the services in charge
of the Nation and of the territorial entities. See Gomez Buendia Hernando and Rodrigo Losada-Lora (1984).5
by the central level, and other educational institutions responsible specially for the training. Finally, the
municipal level is represented in the big cities by Municipal Secretaries of Education.
There is currently a great deal of confusion and incoherence in the administration of the public
education system. Much of this confusion arises because there is still a lack of clarity in the objectives
assigned to each of the administrative levels. There are many instances in which the governmental
entities that should administer certain functions do not have the tools necessary to carry out those
functions. For example, the municipalities should have a central role in the administration of the
education sector, but they have very limited authority for the management of human resources in that
sector. Similarly, the existing regulations emphasize the importance of the Department in planning
educational development, but the Departmental level has little access to the financial resources that
are required to conduct this job properly. The problems faced by all levels of governments are
aggravated by situations such as:
p The Ministry of Education lacks an appropriate data information system that would allow it
to evaluate the current state of public education. For instance, information on the number and
financing of public school teachers is only available up to 1991. Although there are existing
instruments of collecting data on schools and students, the data are not reliable because there
is no quality control.
p There are no mechanisms in the central government to evaluate if the departmental secretaries
of education (or the other departmental educational agencies) implement the national norms
for the administration of the teachers. The monitoring issue is equally problematic in the De-
partments and municipalities. The Departmental supervisors often reach decisions based
more on political recommendations than on the merits of particular policy choices, and neither
their functions not the policy options are clearly defined.
p The Ministry of Education does not have an appropriate mechanism to monitor and evaluate
the use of the financial resources that are transferred to the departments and municipalities.
C. Financing
As Table 4 shows, public expenditures on education increased rapidly in the 1990s, from 3.2 percent
of GDP in 1990 to 4.5 percent in 1997. Expenditures by local governments account for a growing part
of total expenditures on education. Since the enactment of Law 60 of 1993, which implemented articles
357 and 358 of the National Constitution, the transfers of current incomes from the Central Govern-
ment to territorial entities for expenditures in basic public services (such as education, health and
Nation To establish technical, curricular, and pedagogical norms that will be used by the territorial entities as an
orientation.
Department To plan, administer, and coordinate the teaching service, and to decentralize it in the municipalities. To
assume the functions of technical development of the pilot centers. To prepare the teachers. To administer
the funds of confinancing with own resources and to take care of the infrastructure and investments in the
educational establishments.
Municipalities To administer the pre-scholar, primary, secondary, and medium service on the terms that the department
delegates. To make the necessary investments in infrastructure and maintenance of the educational esta-
blishments. To inspect and supervice the provision of educational services.
Table 3. Distribution of Education Functions According to the Constitution of 1991
(Law 60 of 1993 and 115 of 1994)6
basic water and sewerage) has grown by more than 2 percent of GDP. Nearly 65 percent of these
transfers have been assigned to the education sector, mainly to improve the wages of teachers.
Table 5 shows that the municipalities and Departments contribute a relatively small amount (14
percent of the total) to the financing of public education. It is worth noting that-in addition to the
transfers mandated by the Constitution-it was necessary to create a Fund of Educational Compensation
in 1996 to finance the budget deficits caused by education expenditures by local jurisdictions.
Table 4. Public Expenditures on Education as percent of GDP
Year  Central Government Local Government Total
1991 0,8      2,3   3,1
1993 1,3  2,5    3,8
1994 1,0  2,5  3,6
1996 1,6 2,8  4,3
1997 1,6 2,9  4,5
Average, 1970s   1,1        2,0   3,1
Average, 1980s  0,9          2,5 3,4
Average, 1990s 1,3   2,6  3,8
Source: Misión Social DNP, Based on formulary F-400 of the DANE.
Percent of total
National Transfers 86
Situado Fiscal (to the departments) 53
Current Income Participation (to the municipalities) 16







Source: National Planning Department, "Como va la Decentralización, 1998".
Table 5. Financing Public Education, 1997
Finally it is important to note that the geographic distribution of the transfers is inefficient and ine-
quitable. The monetary transfers are based on the number of teachers as of 1993, regardless of changes
in underlying conditions.
Table 6 shows that 68.4 percent of the teachers are employed in the public sector. About 80 percent
of the teachers in the public sector are employed by the central government or are nationalized, while
20 percent work for departments or municipalities.
D. Teachers Union and the Estatuto Docente
As in other countries of Latin America, the association of teachers in Colombia combines aspects of a
professional association and a conventional labor union. Overall, however, educational policies have not
been the main interest of FECODE, the Colombian Federation of teachers. Instead, most of the union’s
actions suggest that the key goal is to improve the economic and professional status of teachers.7
The conflicts between the government and FECODE have typically arisen over financial and
administrative matters. The financial conflict arises because of the systematic inadequacy of funds for
public education. The origin of the administrative conflicts lies in the confusion over the functions
assigned to the various levels of government. FECODE supports the nationalization of public expen-
diture in education because, as Duarte (1996) states, "this will enhance its power as a national inter-
mediary between the central government and the teachers. This also explains the strong opposition
of FECODE to the descentralisation..."
The current regulations of the teaching profession in Colombia have their origin in an educational
statute (Estatuto Docente) promulgated in 1979. This statute specifiees the norms that regulate the
recruitment, labor stability, promotion, and retirement of teachers. The statute, and particularly the
way it has been administered, have introduced a number of inefficiencies into public education.
p Too much centralization: Teacher salaries are set by the central government, with little input from
the regional government agencies that end up paying the bill.
p Inefficient appointment process: The Departments and the Municipalities can create temporary
teaching positions. The provisions of the Estatuto Docente imply that these short-term posi-
tions eventually become permanent positions, putting additional pressure on the central go-
vernment to increase its monetary transfers.
p Ineffective disciplinary regime: The directives (rectors) do not exercise any disciplinary control
over the teachers. The Estatuto Docente orders that promotions be determined internally wit-
hin the magistery, using a set of rules that are not always related to teaching activities.
According to the regulations outlined in Law 4 of 1992 and in Law 60 of 1993, the President of the
Republic must set the remuneration of the teachers who are subject to the relevant regulations in the
Estatuto Docente in the first ten days of every year. Table 7 reports the rate of growth in teacher
salaries between 1994 and 1998. Although the real teacher salary declined slightly in 1995, it has risen
considerably since then, at an annual rate of about 3 percent.
E. The Pension System2
On average, teachers in Colombia are 43 years old. They tend to be relatively older than other workers.
As Table 8 shows, the pension benefits granted to teachers are extremely generous. The table com-
Table 6. Number of Teachers by Educational Level
Public Sector and Private Sector, 1997
Educational Level Public number Public Private number Private Total
of teachers percentage of teachers percentage
Preschool  20,749 47.9     22,613 52.1       43,362
Basic primary  141,872 78.3           39,349 21.7    181,221
Basic and medium secondary   104,390 63.0              61,428 37.0   165,818
Total 267,011 68.4    123,390 31.6   390,401
Source: DANE. Social Indicators.
2 This section is based on the technical and preliminary memorandums of the team charged with preparing information on
social security reform.8
pares the pension benefits available to teachers with those established in Law 100 of 1993 (or Law of
Social Security Reform) for other workers in Colombia.3 A number of differences are worth noting:
First, public teachers do not have to contribute to the funding of the system in order to receive a
pension. Most non-teachers contribute 25% (13.5% is obligatory).
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Table 8. Pension Benefit Regimes of the Magistery and Law 100 of 1993
3 Comparison of the benefits of the public teachers (national and nationalized). The territorial regims are not included.
1 The Nation is in charge of the Special Pension and it is recognized and paid by CAJANAL. The Law established that the Fondo de Pensiones Públicas-FOPEP should
do it.
2 The Nation is in charge of all Retirement Pension that began since the promulgation of Law 91 of 1989 (December 29) and will be paid by the Fondo Nacional de
Prestaciones Sociales of the Magistery. But CAJANAL and the Fondo Nacional de Ahorros will be in charge if it is started before the date of promulgagion of that
law.
3 Law 91 of 1989. For the teachers who entered the system since January 1st of 1981, national and nationalized, and for those appointed since 1990, when they
accomplished the legal requirements, only one retirement pension is recognized, equivalent to 75% of the monthly average salary of the last year.
4 Workers Nacionalized, they are the teachers that enter the system by appointment of a territorial entity before January 1st of  1976 and those who entered since that
date, according with the established by the Law 43 of 1975.9
Second, teachers qualify to receive the special pension (pensión de gracia) at 50 years of age. Under
the pay-as-you-go system set up by Law 100 of 1993 for non-teachers, the retirement age is 55 for
women and 60 for men.
Third, a different base salary is used to calculate the pension for teachers and non-teachers. The
special pension is based on the basic monthly salary that the teacher had at the time of retirement,
including bonuses and other benefits. In addition, the teacher’s retirement pension is based on the
average salary of the last year employed. In contrast, the pension benefits for non-teachers are based
on the average salary in the last 10 years of the entire career if more than 1.250 weeks have been
contributed.
Fourth, teachers typically receive 75 percent of the base salary, while non-teachers receive between
65 and 85 percent of the base salary, depending on the number of weeks that the worker contributed
to the system.
Finally, the pension regime grants teachers the right to receive several of these pensions
simultaneously.
Table 9 documents the liability that the generous pension programs for teachers have created for
the Colombian economy. The current liability of the pensions for the 303 thousand active teachers is
30 percent of GDP. This compares to a liability of 40 percent of GDP for the 2.3 million non-teachers
covered by the Instituto de Seguros Sociales.
Active Pensioned Passive liability
beneficiaries as percent of GDP
Teachers 303,000 61,848 30.0
Beneficiaries of the Social
Security Institute 2,300,000 435,000 40.0
Table 9. Pension Liability in 1999
The teacher pension system has obviously imposed a huge liability on the Colombian economy.
We have identified three distinct problems that make it unlikely that this liability can be reduced
substantially in the short run:
p The level of current expenditures to current pensioners is very high.
p A high proportion of working teachers are nearing retirement age.
p The pension system grants relatively generous and expensive benefits to teachers.
III. Evaluating the Impact of Education Policy Reforms
In view of the substantial changes in education policy adopted by the Colombian government during
the 1990s, it is worth investigating if the reforms had an observable impact on the educational
opportunities faced by school-ages children. In this section, we examine several related issues. First,
how did the reforms affect the economic opportunities available to public school teachers? Second,
did the reforms increase the enrollment rate of school-age children? Third, are teacher resources
better allocated across localities in the post-reform period (either through increase internal migration
of teachers or through increased employment in the localities where teachers were most needed)?10
And, finally, is there evidence of geographic convergence in the educational opportunities available
to Colombian children?
To evaluate the impact of the education policy reforms, we used the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
(ENH), a national household survey conducted quarterly by the Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadística (DANE). The survey covers 10 Colombian cities. Although the five largest
cities in the country are covered by the survey, the survey also covers medium-sized and smaller
cities. One drawback of using the available ENH data for analyzing the impact of the education
reforms is that it only covers the urban labor markets of Colombia. We use the ENH Surveys for June
1991, June 1994, and June 1998. The trends between 1991 and 1994 help us describe what was hap-
pening in Colombia’s education sector prior to the enactment of the decentralization reforms in Law
60 of 1993. The trends between 1994 and 1998 help us describe the changes that occurred in the post-
decentralization period. With the exception of teacher salaries, which experienced a significant
increase after 1994, the trends in several measures of educational outcomes are roughly similar both
before and after 1994. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the education reforms had much impact on
Colombia’s education system.
A. Trends in Teacher Salaries
Table 10 summarizes the trends in teachers salaries between 1991 and 1998. Public school teachers
earn more than private school teachers and earn far more than the rest of the workers in the Colombian
labor market. In 1998, public school teachers earned around 135 percent more than non-teachers,
while private school teachers earned about 75 percent more than non-teachers.
Much of the wage advantage accruing to public school teachers can be accounted for by differences
in observable socioeconomic characteristics, particularly differences in educational attainment. The
wage differentials between teachers and non-teachers fall dramatically when one controls for
differences in various socioeconomic characteristics between the groups, including educational
attainment, age, hours of work, and region of residence. In 1998, for example, the 135 percent wage
advantage enjoyed by public school teachers is reduced to only an 11.3 percent advantage after one
controls for differences in some socioeconomic characteristics, particularly educational attainment,
between the two groups. Similarly, the 75 percent wage advantage enjoyed by private sector teachers
becomes a 4 percent wage disadvantage. In other words, even though private school teachers earn
more than the typical worker in the Colombian labor market, they earn slightly less than comparably
skilled non-teachers.
Table 10. Teacher Salaries, 1991-1998
1991 1994 1998
(1) (2) (1) (3) (1) (3)
Percent wage gap between private-school 19.8 -23.4 31.8 -19.4 74.9 -3.8
teachers and non-teachers
Percent wage gap between public-school 80.2 0.7 71.6  -5.0 134.9 11.3
teachers and non-teachers
Wage gap adjusted for differences in No Yes No Yes No Yes
background characteristics
Source: Appendix Table A-1.11
The data also show that the reforms in educational attainment increased the average pay of both
public school and private school teachers. The relative salary of teachers was relatively stable between
1991 and 1994, but increased substantially between 1994 and 1998. For example, the unadjusted
percent wage gap between public school teachers and non-teachers fell slightly from 80 to 72 percent
between 1991 and 1994, but rose from 72 to 135 percent between 1994 and 1998. Similarly, the
unadjusted percent wage gap between private school teachers and non-teachers rose from 20 to 32
percent between 1991 and 1994, but rose between 32 to 75 percent between 1994 and 1998.
The fact that the education reforms increased the mean wage of all teachers by roughly the same
amount implies that the wage gap between public school and private school teachers remained
relatively constant over the period. In both 1994 and 1998, public school teachers earn about 15 percent
more than comparably skilled private school teachers. The education reforms enacted in the 1990s,
therefore, do not seem to have altered the relative incentives of teachers to enter the public and private
sectors. Nevertheless, the increased pay of teachers should, in the end, provide additional incentives
for more workers to enter the teaching profession in Colombia.
B. Trends in Enrollment Rates
An explicit goal of the education reforms undertaken by the Colombian government in the 1990s was
to provide better educational opportunities for the country’s children. Table 11 summarizes some of
the key descriptive trends in school enrollment rates in the population of children aged 5 to 16.
Perhaps the most striking result is that even though enrollment rates were increasing prior to 1994,
there was a slight decline in enrollment rates between 1994 and 1998. The fraction of children aged
5 to 16 enrolled in school rose from 88.6 to 90.6 percent between 1991 and 1994, but declined from 90.6
to 90.1 percent between 1994 and 1998.
Table 11. Enrollment Rates of Children Aged 5-16, 1991-1998
Age group 1991 1994 1998
5-6   76,2       83,9     87,3
7-8 95,8     96,6    95,4
10-13 95,1   95,8   93,7
14-16 80,3   82,2  81,9
All ages 88,6  90,6 90,1
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. DANE.
There are dramatic variations around this general trend across various age groups. For example,
the enrollment rate increased substantially in the post-reform period from 83.9 to 87.3 percent for the
youngest children (aged 5 and 6), but declined for all other age groups. Therefore, even though the
overall evidence shows that enrollment rates declined between 1994 and 1998, the youngest children
-the children who are probably the most likely to be affected by the additional teaching resources- did
experience a substantial increase in their enrollment rates. Note, however, that the enrollment rate of
this group was rising rapidly even before the education reforms. Between 1991 and 1994, the enroll-
ment rate of children aged 5-6 increased from 76.2 to 83.9 percent. It is difficult, therefore, to attribute
much of the 1991-1994 enrollment increase among the youngest children in Colombia to the decentra-
lization reforms.12
There is also significant variation in the school enrollment trends across households belonging to
different socioeconomic "stratum."4 As Table 12 shows, there are substantial differences in enrollment
rates among children in the different socioeconomic classes, with the lower socioeconomic classes
having substantially lower enrollment rates at any given age. For instance, in 1998 the enrollment rate
of children aged 10 to 13 who come from the low socioeconomic class was 90.2 percent, the rate for
children who come from the middle class was 95.7 percent, and the rate for children who come from
the high socioeconomic class was 96.0 percent. Not surprisingly, the household’s socioeconomic class
is an important determinant of whether the children in that household are enrolled in school.
However, the evidence also shows that the enrollment rate increased most for the youngest chil-
dren who come from the lower socioeconomic classes. For instance, the enrollment rate of children
aged 5 to 6 who come from low socioeconomic class households increased by about 10 percent points
in 1991-1994 (before the education reforms), and by an additional 4 percentage points, from 76.7 to
80.9 percent in 1994-1998. Again, it is difficult to infer from the data that the education reforms had
much beneficial impact on the enrollment rates of disadvantaged young children in Colombia.
4 The definitions are as follows: the "low" socioeconomic group has values of "low-low" or "low" in the stratum variable
contained in the ENH; the "middle" group has values of "medium-low" or "medium"; and the "high" group has values of
"medium-high" or "high".
Table 12. Enrollment Rates, by Socioeconomic Strata
Low Middle High
Age group 1991 1994 1998 1991 1994 1998 1991 1994 1998
5-6   66.4  76.7 80.9  81.2  87.8 90.5 92 96.9 98.2
7-8  93.5 94.5 92.2 97.1 97.9 97.3 99 98.2 97.3
10-13 92.6 93.5 90.2 96.4 97.0 95.7 98 97.6 96.0
14-16 70.2 73.8 73.1 85.4 86.5 86.9 84 89.6 85.6
All ages 83.4  86.2 85.0 91.4 93.0 93.0 93 95.1 94.0
Source: Encuesta Nacional de Hogares. DANE.
C. Internal Migration of Teachers
The debate over the performance of the public education sector in Colombia often assumes that there
is a misallocation of teachers across geographic areas. There are "too many" teachers in some loca-
tions, and "too few" in others. This misallocation of teachers can generate a substantial amount of inef-
ficiency in the provision of public education to Colombia’s children. In effect, teachers are relatively
scarce in those areas where they are most needed, and relatively abundant in less crucial localities.
This type of discussion effectively assumes that teachers-and public school teachers, in particular-
exhibit a type of "job lock." Because of political, social, or economic reasons, teachers resist moving
across localities once they obtain a teaching position. In this section we examine the validity of the
hypothesis that teachers are particularly immobile in the Colombian labor market.
By definition, a migrant is a worker who has resided in the current city for two years or less. Table
13 summarizes the descriptive evidence on migration rates available in the ENH. The data clearly
show that teachers, regardless of whether they teach in public or private schools, have substantially
lower migration rates than non-teachers. For instance, the migration rate for non-teachers is 6.713
percent in the 1998 ENH survey, indicating that 6.7 percent of non-teachers had moved across localities
in the two-year period prior to the survey (i.e., between 1996 and 1998). The mobility rate of workers in
the teaching profession is far lower. In 1998, for example, only 4.3 percent of private school teachers and
3.4 percent of public school teachers had moved across cities in the prior two years. In short, teachers
have substantially lower internal migration rates than non-teachers, and public school teachers seem
to have particularly low migration rates. It is also worth noting that there was a marked decline in
internal migration rates of public school teachers both between 1991 and 1994, and between 1994 and
1998. The migration rates for these teachers fell from 5.1 to 4.8 percent between 1991 and 1994, and
from 4.8 to 3.4 percent between 1994 and 1998. If anything, the inefficiencies implied by job-lock
among public school teachers increased during the period of the education reforms.
Remarkably, much of the gap in internal migration rates between teachers and non-teachers
disappears once we adjust for differences in socioeconomic characteristics among the various groups,
particularly their age. In 1998, the unadjusted difference in the probability of migration between
public school teachers and non-teachers is 3.4 percentage points. We show in the Technical Appendix
that this unadjusted gap drops to 1.4 percentage points (and is not statistically significant) when the
regression specification is expanded to include the worker’s age as a regressor, and drops further to
0.4 percentage points when the regression also includes the worker’s educational attainment.
It should not be surprising that a large part of the unadjusted migration rate differential between
public school teachers and non-teachers can be attributed to differences in socioeconomic characteristics
between the groups, particularly differences in their age distribution. After all, it is well known that
migration rates decline with age in many countries (Greenwood, 1997). In the United States, for
example, 7.2 percent of college graduates in their late 20s moved across state lines between 1996 and
1997, as compared to 2.4 percent of college graduates aged 35 to 45, and 1.6 percent of college
graduates in their 50s (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997, Table 5). Labor economists typically
explain this empirical pattern by arguing that the economic payoff to internal migration, like the
economic payoff to all human capital investments, decline as workers get older (since older workers
have fewer years in which to recoup the costs of making the move to their new location).
As we noted earlier, public school teachers in Colombia are, on average, much older than other
workers. In 1998, for example, the typical public school teacher was 42.0 years old, as compared to 34.7
years old for private school teachers, and 35.1 years old for non-teachers. This sizable difference in
the mean age between public school teachers and other workers is the key factor responsible for the
relative immobility of teachers in the Colombian labor market. In other words, Colombian public
school teachers are relatively less mobile not because of factors that are specific to the teaching
profession, but because public school teachers are substantially older and internal migration rates
tend to decline with age.
Table 13. Migration Rates of Teachers and Non-teachers, 1991-1998
Percent of workers who migrated in the last two years
1991 1994 1998
Public school teachers  5.1    4.8 3.4
Private school teachers   5.6   5.0 4.3
All others workers  6.7  7.4 6.7
Source: Appendix Table A-2.14
This simple fact may have important implications for future discussions of education policy and
teacher mobility in Colombia. After all, it is probably desirable to reduce the inefficiency created in
the education sector by the job-lock of teachers attached to particular regions. Ideally, teaching
resources would be fluid across localities, responding to market needs. One obvious incentive system
that would motivate teachers to move across areas would be to institute a system of regional
differences in teacher pay, with the financial rewards being greater in those areas where teaching
resources are most needed. The fact that teachers tend to be relatively older, however, implies that
the regional wage differentials required to induce teachers to migrate to the targeted cities might have
to be substantial. As a result, it may be relatively expensive to reduce inefficiencies in the education
sector in Colombia by encouraging more internal migration of public school teachers.
Finally, it is worth noting that the analysis presented in this section does not provide any evidence
on an additional source of allocative inefficiency that is also part of the debate over education policy
in Colombia, namely the allocation of teaching resources between the urban and rural sectors. The
available ENH data only provides information for workers who reside in the largest metropolitan
areas. It seems plausible to conjecture that there is even less internal migration of teachers between
the rural and urban sectors. Future research should make it a priority to measure the extent and
determinants of job-lock in teacher resources between these sectors.
D. Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Teachers
Because teachers are relatively immobile across cities in Colombia, the government could improve
access to educational opportunities in "disadvantaged" areas by hiring relatively more teachers in
those cities where the school-going population is growing rapidly or where there is a relative shortage
of teachers relative to the size of the school-going population. There was, in fact, a substantial increase
in the number of teachers-employed in both private and public schools-between 1991 and 1998. In
1991 there were 220,127 public sector teachers and 77,500 private teachers In 1994, there were 231,992
public sector teachers and 98,615 private sector teachers. By 1998, there were 303,225 public sector
teachers and around 125,000 private sector teachers.
It is well known that there are long-standing structural differences in access to publicly provided
educational opportunities across regions and cities in Colombia. Hence it is of interest to investigate
if the teaching resources provided by the additional hires were allocated in ways that cater to the
needs of the school-going population. In particular, did teacher employment grow fastest in the areas
where the teachers would seem to be most needed?Our analysis (summarized in the Technical
Appendix) indicated that the percentage increase in the number of public school teachers allocated
to a particular geographic area between 1994 and 1998 was greatest in those areas that had the largest
number of potential students per available teacher as of 1994. This correlation, moreover, is statisti-
cally significant and numerically important. An increase of about 20 percent in the children-teacher
ratio in 1994 is associated with an additional 15 percentage points of employment growth for public
school teachers between 1994 and 1998. It seems, therefore, that the additional education resources
-in terms of additional teacher employment- were indeed allocated to the areas most in need.
Our empirical analysis indicates that this correlation was also positive, but statistically very weak,
in the 1991-1994 period. In other words, there is some evidence that even before the decentralization
reforms the number of public school teachers was growing somewhat more rapidly in those areas
with the greatest "client population". This correlation, however, was not statistically significant in the
1991-1994 period. It seems, therefore, that the education reforms helped to strengthen the efficient
sorting of new teaching resources across geographic areas in Colombia.15
E. Geographic Convergence in Educational Opportunities
An important goal of the educational reforms enacted during the 1991s was to equalize the
educational opportunities available across localities in Colombia. Our data indicates that there was
some convergence in educational opportunities across the 30 cities that are identified in the ENH
between 1991 and 1998.
Our empirical analysis (described in the Technical Appendix) shows that there was a narrowing
of differences in the following variables between 1994 and 1998:
p The number of school-age children per teacher.
p The enrollment rate (defined as the fraction of the school-age population that is enrolled in
school).
p The pupil/teacher ratio
Before one can attribute the 1994-1998 equalization of outcomes across geographic areas to the
decentralization reforms, however, it is important to determine the nature of the pre-existing trends.
The Technical Appendix also shows that the narrowing in these measures of education opportunities
was already occurring even prior to 1994. Moreover, the convergence trends-from a statistical
perspective-seem to be as strong before 1994 as they are after 1994. In short, it is difficult to attribute
any of the post-1994 geographical convergence in educational opportunities to the decentralization
reforms adopted by Colombia in 1993.
It is important to note that we do not know if the convergence found across the 30 cities surveyed
in the ENH also applies to the wider differences in educational access that exist between the rural and
urban sectors.
IV. Policy Implications
This paper has identified a number of problems in the administration of the education system in
Colombia, and has assessed the extent to which the education reforms adopted in the early 1990s have
changed teacher salaries and educational opportunities for Colombia’s children. Overall, our em-
pirical results do not suggest that the education reforms adopted in Law 60 of 1993 had much impact
on the education system. Therefore, many issues remain to be addressed to improve efficiency in the
education system. These include:
A. More Decentralization
There remains a great deal of confusion in the civil service system facing teachers. Much of this
confusion arises because the local jurisdictions that hire teachers have little say over how teacher pay
is determined. At the present, teachers can be hired by authorities in the central government, in the
Departments, or in the municipalities. Teacher salaries and pension benefits, however, are centrally
determined. Moreover, temporary teaching jobs are created by localities, but they often ignore the fact
that because of the provisons of the Estatuto Docente, these temporary positions often evolve into
permanent positions.
The efficiency of the education system would be greatly enhanced if the hiring and salary decisions
were made by the same government jurisdictions. This simple change in the "rules" would encourage16
those who make the decision of hiring a teacher to pay attention to the cost of the decision; as well as
encourage those who set teacher salaries to pay more attention to the factors that determine how
many and which teachers are employed. This simple reform of the system would introduce much-
needed accountability into the civil service for teachers. The teachers union, FECODE, would likely
be opposed to this reform because it would decentralize the labor market for teachers.
B. Allow regional wage differentials
The central setting of teacher salaries creates serious inequities in real pay across geographic regions
of Colombia. Obviously, there are cost of living differentials and differences in amenities across the
various areas of Colombia. By setting a constant nominal salary for teachers throughout the whole
country, the central authorities are effectively creating differences in economic opportunities that
make working in some areas more valuable than working in other areas. Given these differences in
real wages, it should not surprising that teaching resources are not optimally allocated across
Colombia’s geographic regions in the present system.
A simple-though inevitably controversial-change in the pay-setting rules would help remove
much of this inefficiency. The government should allow nominal differences in pay across regions in
Colombia, so that the real wage would be roughly constant across Colombia’s geographic regions. A
constant real wage implies that all geographic areas would be equally remunerative, so that teachers
would not necessarily prefer to work in one area over another. In short, local labor market conditions,
rather than a central mandate of nominal pay equality for all teachers, would determine the salaries
of teachers in Colombia. If there were a shortage in the supply of teachers to a particular locality,
salaries in that region would rise -relative to the salary in the other regions- and thereby attract more
teachers.
C. Pension Reform
The teachers were excluded from the last round of pension reform. At the present time, teachers do
not make any financial contribution to their pension programs. Furthermore, the fund created by the
government to cover the pension payments that will eventually have to be made to teachers has a
huge liability, amounting to 30 percent of GDP. In its agreement with the International Monetary
Fund, the Colombian government agreed to extend the pensions reforms of 1994. Reforming the
teacher pension program should be a central aspect of any pension reform that is undertaken in the
future.
Currently, teachers can retire when they reach the age of 50. Many teachers, in fact, do not retire
at that age, but collect one of the pension benefits available to them while still working in the teaching
profession. We conclude that any pension reform for teachers should incorporate two key changes.
First, it should increase the age of retirement. Second, it should discourage "double-dipping" and
"triple-dipping" from the various teacher pensions.
Our data indicate that teachers are relatively older than other workers, so that a large number of
teachers will be retiring within the next decade. The huge expenditure that will be necessary to meet
the pension liability at that time can be somewhat reduced by making teachers eligible for pensions
at the same time as all other workers in Colombia (i.e., age 55 for women and 60 for men). The
government could also reduce the costs by imposing taxes on teacher pension benefits if the teacher
remains employed after "retirement." In the long run, the pension reform should strive to consolidate17
the various retirement programs available to teachers into a single program, thus reducing the
chances that teachers -unlike other workers in Colombia- can receive two or three pension benefits
in their retirement years.
It would suit the integration of the youngest teachers and of the new ones to the general regime,
for reasons of justness, to take advantage of the advantages of their long labor careers and their
continuity, to introduce competition and efficiency in administration, and to offer freedom and
mobility to the teachers, in benefit of the education.
D. The Escuela Nueva and Other Reforms
Our discussion has focused on ways to improve the administrative efficiency of the education system.
It is clear that there is an equally pressing need to improve the quality of education provided in
Colombia’s public schools. Only 20 percent of the children who enter first grade finish the program
of basic education. Moreover, only about a third of those who complete their basic education do not
repeat a school year.
The Escuela Nueva, a school program that has been widely adopted in Colombia’s rural sector,
seems to have had significant success in improving education opportunities available in that area.
Under this program, teachers have much greater flexibility in making their own decisions regarding
the education process in their classroom. The curriculum is also more independently targeted to
different students and stresses practical problem solving, so that it more easily engages the students.
Parents are also involved through increased participation in school activities. It would be worthwhile
to examine whether this type of program could be expanded to cover Colombia’s public schools in
urban areas.
The recent reforms adopted by Bogotá and Antioquia also show the promise of decentralization
and choosing different institutional frameworks in urban settings.  In Bogotá, the local administration
increased the number of "places" for students by 140,000; with slightly over half (80,000) obtained by
making better use of existing resources, and the remainder by granting funds to private schools to
build new schools in the poorest areas.  The new administrators received "vouchers" equal to what
it would cost to educate a child in one of the purely public schools. These administrators take all
responsibility over the recruiting of teachers and the administration of the school. The evidence
suggests that parents prefer these "mixed" private-public schools, both because of the quality of the
school administration and because of the absence of labor conflict that has been a hallmark of
Colombia’s public schools in the past.
The Department of Antioquia pioneered this type of decentralization. Under the administration
of Governor Alvaro Uribe Vélez (1995-1997), Antioquia wanted to create 100,000 new places for
students without increasing the number of teachers. They achieved this goal by reaching agreements
with professors’ associations and with religious communities, again paying the communities what
it would cost to educate a child in the traditional public school system.18
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Technical Appendix: Measuring the impact of education policy reforms
This technical appendix uses data drawn from the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENH), a national
household survey conducted quarterly by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística
(DANE). The survey covers 10 Colombian cities. Although the five largest cities in the country are
covered by the survey, it also covers medium-sized and smaller cities. One drawback of using the
ENH for analyzing the impact of the education reforms is that it only covers the urban labor markets
of Colombia.
The survey provides information on household characteristics (such as place of residence and
years since the last migration), and on each respondent’s characteristics (such as age, sex, educational
attainment, marital status, and place of birth). The ENH also provides information on a person’s labor
market status, and, if employed, on the worker’s industry and occupation of employment, monthly
salary, and hours of work. We use the June ENH surveys in the calendar years 1991, 1994, and 1998
in our study. The June surveys contain particularly detailed labor market information.
Finally, the ENH uses a random stratified sampling approach. The basic unit of observation in the
survey is the household. We use the sampling weights provided by the ENH throughout the analysis.
Trends in Teacher Salaries
We use the various ENH surveys to calculate both the adjusted and unadjusted wage differential
between teachers and non-teachers in the Colombian labor market. We calculate these wage
differentials for two types of teachers: public school and private school teachers. A worker is a public
school teacher if he or she reports an occupation of «teacher» in the ENH and works in the public
sector. A worker is a private school teacher if he or she reports an occupation of teacher and works
in the private sector.
We estimate the following earnings function separately in each of the ENH surveys:
(1) log wi = Xi b + a1 PUi + a2 PRi  + ei ,
where wi gives the (monthly) monetary income of worker i; X is a vector of socioeconomic
characteristics (described below); PUi is a dummy variable set to unity if the worker is a public school
teacher; and PRi is a dummy variable set to unity if the worker is a private school teacher. The re-
gression model is estimated in the sample of workers aged 18-64.
Initially, we do not include any variables in the standardizing vector X. The coefficients a1 and a2
then measure the unadjusted wage differentials among the various types of workers in the Colombian
labor market. The coefficients reported in the first column of Table A-1 indicate that public school
teachers earn more than private school teachers and earn far more than the rest of the workers in the
Colombian labor market. In 1994, the log wage differential between public school teachers and non-
teachers was 0.54, which translates to an approximate 71.6 percent wage differential between the two
groups.1 Similarly, the log wage differential between public school and private school teachers was
0.276, which translates to an approximate 31.8 percent wage differential between the two groups.
1 The approximate percent wage differential is given by (e.540 - 1) x 100.21
The regression coefficients reported in Table A-1 reveal that much of the wage advantage accruing
to public school teachers can be accounted for by differences in observable socioeconomic charac-
teristics, particularly differences in educational attainment. The wage differentials between teachers
and non-teachers fall dramatically when the vector X is expanded to include the worker’s educational
attainment.2 In 1994, for example, the 0.54 log wage advantaged enjoyed by public school teachers
plummets to a -0.051 log wage disadvantage once the regression controls for educational attainment,
while the 0.276 log wage advantaged enjoyed by private sector teachers becomes a -0.216 log wage
disadvantage. In other words, even though teachers earn more than the typical worker in the Colom-
bian labor market, they earn less than comparably skilled non-teachers.
Internal Migration of Teachers
The ENH surveys report the number of years that they have resided in their current location. We
define a worker to be a migrant if he or she has resided in the current city for two years or less. We
restrict our study of internal migration to the sample of persons who are working at the time of the
survey and who are 18 to 60 years old.
Much of the gap in internal migration rates between teachers and non-teachers disappears once
we adjust for differences in socioeconomic characteristics among the various groups, particularly
their age.3 Consider the regression model:
(2) mi = Xib + a1 PUi + a2 PRi  + ei,
where mi is a dummy variable set to unity if worker i moved across cities in the two-year period
prior to the survey. As before, X is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics; PUi is a dummy variable
Table A-1. Salary Differentials Between Teachers and Non-Teachers, 1991-1998
Regression models Regression models Regression models
estimated in 1991 ENH estimated in 1994 ENH estimated in 1998 ENH
Variable (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Private-school .181 .301 -.267 .276 .357 -.216 .559 .642 -.039
Teachers (.039) (.037) (.031) (.039) (.038) (.034) (.035) (.034) (.030)
Public-school .589 .595 .007 .540 .548 -.051 .854 .866 .107
Teachers (.035) (.033) (.028) (.037) (.035) (.032) (.035) (.034) (.030)
Constrols for:
Age, sex No Yes Yes No  Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: The standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions are estimated in the sample of workers aged 18 to 64.
The regressions in the 1991 sample have 29,112 observations. The regressions in the 1994 sample have 28,532 observations. The
regressions in the 1998 sample have 29,436 observations.
Source: Author's calculations. ENH-DANE.
2 We control for the worker’s educational attainment by including a vector of dummy variables indicating if the worker has
no education, has primary education, has secondary education, or has higher education.
3  Greenwood (1997) surveys the internal migration literature and discusses the determinants of internal migration in a
number of developed countries.22
set to unity if the worker is a public school teacher; and PRi is a dummy variable set to unity if the
worker is a private school teacher. We estimated equation (2) separately in the 1994 and 1998 surveys,
and used the sample of workers who are 18 to 60 years old.
The last six columns of Table A-2 report the differences in migration rates between teachers and
non-teachers (i.e., the coefficients a1 and a2) after controlling for various sets of socioeconomic
characteristics. In 1998, the unadjusted difference in the probability of migration between public
school teachers and non-teachers is 3.4 percentage points. Table A-2 shows that this unadjusted gap
drops to 1.4 percentage points (and is not statistically significant) when the regression specification
is expanded to include the worker’s age as a regressor, and drops further to .4 percentage points when
the regression also includes the worker’s educational attainment.
Determinants of the Increase in the Number of Teachers
We aggregated the ENH household data to the city level, and calculated measures of teacher
employment and educational activities for each of the 30 cities that can be matched in the 1994 and
1998 ENH surveys. Table A-3 summarizes some of the aggregate statistics that can be calculated from
the ENH at the city level. It is evident that the number of public school teachers rose at a substantially
faster rate in some areas. The number of public school teachers, for example, rose by 0.586 log points
in Barranquilla, by 0.460 log points in Bogotá, and by 0.125 log points in Medellin. The table also
illustrates significant regional differences in the educational resources available to students. In 1994,
for example, there were 23.3 school-age children per teacher in Barranquilla, 17.4 in Bogotá, and 28.6
in Soledad.
To examine the question of whether the increase in the number of teachers between 1994 and 1998
occurred in those cities where they would seem to be most needed, we estimated a number of
regression models with the generic specification:
(3) gj = a + blog (Cj /Tj ) + other variables + ej ,
where gj gives the rate of growth in the number of public school teachers employed in city j
(defined as the log of the ratio of the number of public school teachers employed in 1998 to the number
employed in 1994); Cj gives the size of the school-age population in the city (defined as the number
Table A-2. Differentials in Migration Rates Between Teachers and Non-Teachers, 1991-1998
Probability of Adjusted Adjusted
migration differences 1994 differences 1994
Variable 1991 1992 1993 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Public-school .051 .084 .034 -.026 -.006 .017 -.034 -.014 .004
Teachers .048 (.011) (.011) (.012) (.009) (.009) (.010)
Private-school .056 .050 .043 -.024 -.021 -.001 -.024 -.026 -.010
Teachers (.012) (.012) (.012) (.009) (.009) (.009)
All other
Workers .067 .074 .067 - - - - - -
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions are estimated in the sample of workers aged 18 to 60. The
regressions in the 1994 sample have 30,560 observations. The regressions in the 1998 sample have 32,714 observations.
Source: Author's calculations. ENH-DANE.23
of children aged 5 to 16 in 1994), and Tj gives the total number of teachers employed in the city as of
1994. The ratio Cj /Tj, therefore, gives the number of school-age children per available teacher in 1994.
If the new hires were allocated to those cities where they are most needed (in terms of their presumed
educational impact), one would expect the coefficient b to be positive, as the teacher employment
growth should have occurred in those cities where there are the most potential students per available
teacher. To determine if the impact of the number of school-age children per available teacher on the
growth in the employment of public school teachers was affected by the education reforms, we also
estimated equation (3) using the respective data from the 1991-1994 period. The comparison of the
two regressions would allow us to determine if the trends are similar pre- and post-decentralization.
Finally, we estimated the various regression models using an alternative dependent variable: the
growth rate in the number of teachers employed in private schools in city j.
The key results of the regression analysis are reported in Table A-4. It is evident that the 1994-1998
percentage increase in the number of public school teachers was greatest in those areas that had the
largest number of potential students per available teacher as of 1994. This correlation, moreover, is
statistically significant and numerically important since the elasticity is nearly one. The regression
results for 1991-1994 also indicate that the point estimate of the coefficient b is positive. Note, however,
that it is not statistically significant. The allocative efficiency associated with putting new teaching
resources in the areas with the greatest need, therefore, seems to be greater in the post-reform period.
The regressions suggest a number of additional interesting findings. For example, although there
is a strong correlation between the employment growth of public school teachers and the initial
number of school-age children per available teacher, no such correlation exists for private school
teachers in 1994-1998. In other words, the "need for teachers" helps explain the regional dispersion
in the employment growth of public school teachers, but does not help explain the regional dispersion
in the employment growth of private school teachers.
Second, the regressions also show that the correlation measured by the coefficient b in equation
(3) remains even after we control for additional factors that might generate an increase in the number
Table A-3. Regional Differences in the Education Sector (for selected cities)
Rate of Growth in the number of
Private school Public school School-age Number of Number of Number of
teachers teachers children children per students per obervations
teacher in 1994 teachers in 1994
Barranquilla 0.315   0.586  0.060   23.3    21.5 9837
Bello 1.013  -0.744  0.101 23.4  21.7 1020
Bogotá 0.657  0.460 0.109 17.4 16.1 9694
Bucaramanga 0.427   0.288 0.179 19.4 17.0 4928
Cali 0.375 0.527 0.136 22.6 19.7 8826
Cúcuta 0.260 -0.280 0.198 15.0 12.8 5855
Dosquebradas 0.586   0.378 0.119 18.8 17.0 2096
Floridablenca 1.061  0.721 0.277 21.9 20.1 2227
Maizales 0.747 -0.069 0.029 11.8 11.0 7206
Medellín 0.420 0.125 0.211 18.7 16.5 9801
Pasto 0.061 0.176 0.197 8.7 7.6 7600
Pereira 0.389 0.173 0.106 19.1 16.9 4600
Soledad 0.724 0.821 0.074 28.6 27.1 2492
Villavicencio -0.020 0.840 0.097 32.1 28.1 7141
Source: Author's calculations. ENH-DANE.24
of public school teachers employed in a particular locality. For example, the regressions included a
measure of the increase in income in the locality.4 It is likely that localities where incomes are rising
faster might «spend» some of the additional wealth on additional teachers. In fact, there is a strong
positive correlation between fast-rising incomes and the increasing employment of public and
private school teachers, but it remains the case that the number of public school teachers rose most
in the cities where they are many potential students per available teacher.
Geographic Convergence in Educational Opportunities
Our convergence regression model is designed to estimate the extent to which educational opportunities
converge across localities over a particular time period. One possible variable of interest is the relative
number of school-age children per teacher in the locality. The generic regression model has the form:
(4) Dlog(Cjt / Tjt) = a + d log(Cj,t-1 / Tj,t-1) + ejt ,
where Cjt gives the number of school-age children (aged 5 to 16) in city j at time t; and Tjt gives the
total number of teachers in the city at time t. The dependent variable, therefore, gives the log change
in the number of school-age children per teacher between 1991 and 1994 or between 1994 and 1998.
The independent variable gives the level of this variable as of 1991 or as of 1994, depending on the
regression specification.
Teachers in public school Teachers in private schools
1991-1994 1994-1998 1991-1994 1994-1998
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (number of children .145  .196  .757 .834 .657 .722 .292 .424
per teacher in 1994) (.267) (.267) (.259) (.272) (.376) (.334) (.410) (.449)
Rate of growth in city's - 2.156 - 1,863 - 1.987 - 1.744
average income - (1.166) - (0.716) - (1.534) - (1.241)
Rate of growth in number  - -.172  - .206    - -1.624  - .301
of school-age children - (0.902) - (0.864) - (1.306) - (1.561)
Log (number of public - -.023     - - - .096 - -
school teachers in 1994) - (0.047) - - - (0.053) - -
Log (number of private -  -  - -.047 -  - - -.052
school teachers in 1994) - - - (0.059) - - - (.073)
R-squared .014 .186   .271  .460    .122   .410  .026 .133
Sample size 23 23  25 25 24 24 21 21
Notes: Standars errors are reported in parentheses.
Source: Author's calculations. ENH-DANE.
Table A-4. Determinants of Rate of Growth in the Employment of Teachers
4 This variable is given by the change in the city’s mean log income between 1991 and 1994, or between 1994 and 1998.25
The regression model in equation (4) resembles the typical convergence models estimated in the
cross-country growth literature (Barro, 1991; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992). The coefficient d is the
convergence parameter. This coefficient measures the extent to which educational opportunities (as
measured by the number of school-age children per teacher) were equalized across localities over a
particular time period. The coefficient d for the regression estimated over the 1994-1998 period would
be negative if the policy changes implemented in that time period helped equalize educational
opportunities across cities. If d were positive, it would imply divergence in educational opportunities,
for the cities where there were many children per teacher in 1994 were also the cities that experienced
the highest increase in this variable during the 1994-1998 period.
Table A-5 summarizes some of the evidence from our convergence regressions for both the 1991-
1994 and 1994-1998 periods. The top panel of the table shows that the estimated convergence coef-
ficient d is consistently negative in all the specifications, indicating that there was indeed a narrowing
of differences in the number of school-age children per teacher across the 30 Colombian cities in the
ENH data both between 1991 and 1994 and between 1994 and 1998. In the 1991-94 period, the estimate
of d is -.516, with a standard error of .177. In the 1994-1998 period, the estimate of d is -.473, with a
standard error of .235. In other words, the change in the number of school-age children per teacher
was smallest (i.e., most negative) in those cities that had the most school-age children per teacher at
the beginning of the period. The regression analysis, therefore, implies that the rate of convergence
in the number of school-age children per teacher was not affected by the education reforms.
Table A-5. Convergence Regressions
Sample period
1991-1994 1994-1998
Dependent variable (1) (2) (1) (2)
Change in log (number of school-age children per teacher)
Log (number of school-age children per teacher at -.516 -.514 -.473 -.754
beginning of cample period) (.183) (.170) (.235) (.186)
Change in log incomes over sample period  - -1,753 - -2,102
- (.758) - (.467)
Change in log (enrollment rate)
Log (enrollment rate at beginning of sample period) -.200 -.217  -.433 -.401
(.117) (.116) (.150) (.149)
Change in log incomes over sample period - .101  - -.004
- (.072) - (.048)
Change in log (number of students per teacher)
Log (number of students per teacher at beginning -.524   -.517   -.588   -.791
of sample period) (.177) (.166) (.234) (.178)
Change in log incomes over sample period     - -1,631 -  -2,052
- (.760) - (.447)
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 1991-1994 convergence regressions have 29 observations. The sample
sizes for the 1994-1998 convergence regressions are as follows: The regressions for the number of school-age children per
teacher have 26 observations; the regressions for the enrollment rate have 29 observations; and the regressions for the number
of students per teacher have 26 observations. All regressions are weighted by the sample size of the cell used for calculating
the dependent variable.
Source: Author's calculations. ENH-DANE.26
The remaining panels of the table attempt to determine if there was convergence in other measures
of educational output. The middle panel of the table, for example, shows that there was also a great
deal of convergence in the enrollment rate across cities (where the enrollment rate is defined as the
fraction of the school-age population that is enrolled in school). As before, the convergence coefficient
is negative and significant in both time periods. Finally, the bottom panel of the table examines the
degree of convergence that took place in the pupil/teacher ratio, a commonly used measure of
educational quality in the literature. The evidence again indicates that there was a great deal of
convergence in the pupil/teacher ratio in the both the 1991-1994 and 1994-1998 periods.
Overall, we find strong evidence of equalization of educational opportunities across Colombia’s
localities throughout the 1990s. The evidence does not suggest that much of this convergence can be
attributed to the education reforms because the rate of convergence is roughly constant throughout
the decade.27
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